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nortH aMerica
arizona’S Sb 1070: endangerS 
vulnerable groupS
Absent national immigration reform, 
Arizona’s state legislature passed 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, also called the 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act (Act). The legislation 
requires police to inquire into the immigra-
tion status of individuals whom an officer 
has reasonable suspicion are in the country 
illegally and to detain those individuals 
who cannot prove their legal immigration 
status. Similar legislation has been pro-
posed by other states throughout the U.S. 
The potential impact of the Act on asylum 
seekers, victims of human trafficking, and 
domestic violence victims is particularly 
concerning. Immigrants in these situations 
may be undocumented for the purposes of 
the Act.
The Act creates a state crime of “[w]
illful failure to complete or carry an alien 
registration document.” However, a person 
is only guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she 
violates 8 U.S.C.§ 1304(e) or § 1306(a), 
requiring individuals to carry a federally 
issued Alien Registration Certificate or 
Receipt Card. The Act is not applicable to 
individuals who have valid visas or other 
grounds to remain in the U.S. Under the 
Act, a person is presumed to be lawfully 
present in the U.S. if the person provides 
the officer any of the following: a valid 
Arizona driver’s license, non-operating 
identification license, tribal identification, 
or valid U.S. federal, state or local govern-
ment issued identification, if proof of law-
ful residency or citizenship is required to 
obtain the identification.
Individuals who have applied for asy-
lum can remain in the U.S. while awaiting 
adjudication of their application; however, 
they may only have the forms that they 
submitted or receipt notices from U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS). The Act fails to provide instruc-
tions for police if an alien claims that his 
or her application is pending, and is also 
silent about whether USCIS receipt notices 
qualify under the fourth category of valid 
proof of lawful presence. This ambiguity 
gives law enforcement broad discretion, 
which may lead to abuse and the unjusti-
fied detention of individuals who have ini-
tiated the process to legalize their status in 
the U.S. Failing to recognize USCIS receipt 
notices carried by an asylum applicant and 
detaining an individual awaiting adjudica-
tion of his asylum application contravenes 
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, as modified by 
the 1967 Protocol, prohibiting countries 
from penalizing refugees because of illegal 
entry if they are fleeing persecution. As 
a state party to the protocol, the U.S. is 
bound by Article 31.
The Act also endangers human traffick-
ing victims, many of whom are undocu-
mented immigrants. Some enter the U.S. 
legally and willingly, but their immigration 
status expires after they are enslaved; oth-
ers are forced to travel to the U.S. through 
legal means or are voluntarily smuggled 
in, but are enslaved upon arrival. Even 
after a human trafficking victim escapes, 
he or she may still be vulnerable to arrest 
and detention under the Act. Victims of 
trafficking awaiting T or U visas may lack 
required proof of lawful presence under 
the Act. By criminalizing the failure to 
produce this proof, the Act punishes the 
victims instead of the traffickers.
Local law enforcement is in a difficult 
position — it must uphold Arizona law, 
while the United States is bound by its obli-
gation under the trafficking Protocol. The 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, states that a country 
should provide for the physical safety of 
trafficking victims within its territory and 
adopt appropriate measures allowing vic-
tims to stay temporarily or permanently. 
Although the U.S. provides protective mea-
sures for victims of trafficking through 
the T and U visa programs, the Act threat-
ens the effectiveness of these programs 
because victims may be subject to arrest 
and detention while they wait for their visa 
to be granted.
Undocumented victims of domes-
tic violence are also vulnerable and less 
likely to seek help under the new Act. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) provides a waiver to 
domestic violence victims who unlawfully 
entered the U.S. This waiver allows victims 
to remain in the U.S. through a self-petition 
for legal status under the federal Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The 
victims must file a police report to begin 
the visa application process. However, the 
Act adds an additional element of fear of 
law enforcement, which may discourage 
victims from reporting abuse.
In reshaping its immigration policy, 
the U.S. has both domestic and interna-
tional legal obligations to protect vulner-
able groups. However, the Act fails to 
provide this protection. U.S. immigration 
policy, whether formulated by states or 
the national government, must conform to 
international legal obligations.
allegationS againSt canada For 
coMplicity in torture oF aFgHanS
A Canadian Parliamentary commit-
tee recently heard testimony suggest-
ing that Canada’s policy of transferring 
Afghan detainees to Afghan security 
forces amounted to complicity in tor-
ture. In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) assumed control 
of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) and its mandate to assist the 
Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining 
security. Initially, ISAF transferred detain-
ees to U.S. forces. However, since 2005, 
NATO has transferred detainees directly 
to the National Directorate of Security 
(NDS), Afghanistan’s intelligence service. 
International obligations, such as Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the 
International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) prohibit NATO member 
states from exposing detainees to a substan-
tial risk of torture. However, civil society 
and government representatives expressed 
concern that detainees transferred to the 
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NDS may be subject to torture. By 2008, 
Canada had quietly suspended detainee 
transfers.
Richard Colvin, former diplomat with 
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, remarked 
in 2009 to a Parliamentary committee on 
the Afghanistan mission, “[a]ccording to 
our information, the likelihood is that all 
the Afghans we handed over were tortured. 
For interrogators in Kandahar, it was stan-
dard operating procedure.” As a member 
of NATO, Canada’s reticence to continue 
NATO’s practice of detainee transfer raises 
important questions for NATO and its con-
stituent forces.
According to the International 
Committee for the Red Cross, the conflict 
in Afghanistan ended when the transi-
tional government was established in 2002. 
Nevertheless, all parties to the conflict 
must, at a minimum, abide by Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
requiring the humane treatment of all indi-
viduals not participating in the conflict, 
including civilians and wounded, captured, 
and surrendered combatants. Thus, under 
Common Article 3 and the rules of custom-
ary international humanitarian law, trans-
ferring detainees to a state where they may 
be tortured is a serious breach of Canada’s 
international obligations. Additionally, 
allegations of torture, if substantiated, 
could mean Afghanistan failed to comply 
with Common Article 3.
International treaties including the 
ICCPR and the CAT, to which Canada and 
Afghanistan are state parties, also prohibit 
torture. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides 
that “[In] time[s] of public emergency” 
states may not derogate from the prohibi-
tion on torture. Moreover, the non-refoule-
ment principle of customary international 
law, contained in Article 3(1) of the CAT, 
specifically prohibits the expulsion, return, 
or extradition of a person to a state where 
there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he may be subject to torture. Under 
Article 1 of the CAT, the obligations of 
states parties also extend to official com-
plicity in, consent, or acquiescence to acts 
of torture. Article 2 requires state parties 
to take effective measures to prevent tor-
ture in territory under their jurisdiction, 
and Article 4 requires all State Parties to 
prohibit participation and complicity in 
torture. According to the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), the absolute prohibi-
tion on transferring detainees to where 
they risk torture or other ill-treatment is 
incorporated in the prohibition on torture 
and other ill-treatment itself. Also, some 
argue that a state’s obligation not to torture 
or ill-treat detainees extends to the condi-
tions to which detainees are transferred. 
Amnesty International USA points out, “A 
state cannot claim to be treating detainees 
humanely while knowingly handing them 
over to torturers — be they within one 
state outside it, citizens of the same state 
or officials of another — anymore than 
it can knowingly ‘release’ detainees in a 
minefield and claim that their safety is no 
longer its responsibility.”
In a legal opinion prepared for the 
HCR in 2001, international lawyer Elihu 
Lauterpacht and Queen’s Counsel to the 
Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, 
Daniel Bethlehem, argued that a state’s 
obligation under the principle of non-
refoulement has no limitation or excep-
tions. As a state party to the CAT, Canada 
cannot transfer detainees if there are sub-
stantial grounds to believe that they may 
be tortured. Canadian military officials 
received numerous warnings from diplo-
matic staff regarding potential torture and 
knew of incidents in which a prisoner with 
marks on his body was found near “a pair 
of suspicious cables.”
In February 2007, Amnesty International 
Canada and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association filed for an order 
from the Federal Court of Canada to cease 
detainee transfers and require Canada to 
account for individuals previously trans-
ferred. The Federal Court of Canada and the 
Military Police Complaints Commission, 
an independent quasi-judicial body estab-
lished by the Canadian Parliament, are 
evaluating the military’s knowledge of tor-
ture in Afghan prisons.
NATO forces are faced with a dif-
ficult decision. The institutional arrange-
ment between NATO and the Afghan secu-
rity forces has failed to protect detainees 
from torture. The findings of the Federal 
Court of Canada and the Military Police 
Complaints Commission will be interna-
tionally significant as they may critique 
NATO policy regarding the transfer of 
Afghan detainees — a policy that many 
countries have adopted.
Aimee Mayer, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
North America for the Human Rights Brief.
latin aMerica
criMinalizing Social MoveMentS  
in peru
Peru has taken a dangerous step 
toward endangering social protestors by 
passing Decree Law 1095 (Decree 1095) 
on September 1, 2010. Decree 1905 is 
a response to protests by communities 
against a national irrigation project. The 
law permits deployment of the military dur-
ing civil unrest, including demonstrations, 
and the use of military courts for prosecut-
ing any “illicit conduct” by soldiers during 
protests. The use of military courts to pros-
ecute human rights abuses is in violation 
of international human rights standards. 
Moreover, deploying the military (trained 
to fight armies, not police civilians) to 
manage social protests comes precariously 
close to violating human rights, including 
the right of assembly and freedom of asso-
ciation listed in Articles 15 and 16 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 
to which Peru is a signatory.
Most significantly, Decree 1095 autho-
rizes the use of military courts to hear 
complaints of human rights abuses com-
mitted against protestors. International 
human rights standards and the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee have 
consistently implored signatories of the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) to prosecute mili-
tary personnel in civilian courts when the 
alleged conduct includes human rights 
abuses. Additionally, in decisions such as 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has 
reiterated states’ obligations to discontinue 
the prosecution of army personnel for 
human rights violations in military courts. 
Moreover, trials in Peru’s military courts 
often end in impunity. Therefore, trying 
military personnel for human rights abuses 
in military courts could impede the justice 
sought by Peru’s citizens.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Peruvian military committed numerous 
human rights violations while fighting 
domestic terrorism. Little justice has been 
served for these abuses. Peruvian President 
Alan García was in his first presidential 
term from 1985 to 1990, and allegedly 
authorized unnecessary use of military 
force. During the Accomarca massacre in 
August 1985, 69 unarmed civilians were 
killed by the Peruvian armed forces in an 
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anti-terrorism operation. Many of the accu-
sations against President García are either 
still under investigation or were archived 
without a verdict. Given this history, mili-
tary courts will not likely exercise impar-
tiality, and use of the courts to prosecute 
human rights violations will decrease both 
deterrence and likelihood of justice.
Moreover, the mandates of military 
courts often contravene international stan-
dards of judicial independence, transpar-
ency, and impartiality. Military courts fre-
quently only investigate allegations against 
lower ranking members, and may cre-
ate discrepancies between the standards 
applied to civilian and military human 
rights violators. For this reason, military 
courts are ill-suited to prosecute civil 
human rights abuses.”
Decree 1095 also authorizes use of mil-
itary force against protestors. The decree 
itself does not criminalize protests or vio-
late the rights of assembly and association; 
however, human rights organizations are 
concerned that it may open the door to 
such violations based on the military’s 
history. The decree could threaten social 
movements and protests, which are a vital 
means for democratic participation in 
South America where lobbying opportuni-
ties are limited and weaker governments 
have fragile checks and balances.
Decree 1095 may become especially 
relevant to Cusco and Espinar commu-
nity members who are currently protesting 
planned irrigation systems that they believe 
will constrict their own water supply. 
Although two judicial rulings have post-
poned the government-led project until an 
environmental impact assessment is com-
pleted, the government continues to move 
forward in defiance of the court. The dis-
regard of the court’s judgment is evidence 
of the weak checks and balances. At least 
one man has been killed and 28 injured in 
the unrest. Social protests such as these are 
an essential tool for balancing the govern-
ment’s power. Nevertheless, protestors may 
suffer violent consequences and human 
rights violators will likely receive impunity 
as a result of Decree 1095.
President García, whose primary 
agenda has been economic development in 
the country, argues that continuing with the 
irrigation project is an economic benefit to 
Peru’s population. He believes the irriga-
tion will increase agricultural production 
in other regions and provide an alternative 
for the mining-dependent economy. Yet, his 
issuance of Decree 1095 demonstrates that 
he is more concerned with economic diver-
sification than protection of fundamental 
human rights of members of the Cusco and 
Espinar communities.”
Decree 1095 represents a step back-
ward for human rights in Peru. In 2009, 
the country’s judicial system demonstrated 
its independence in what was regarded as 
a fair trial for bringing former President 
Fujimori to justice for human rights 
abuses. Moreover, Fujimori’s prosecution 
was a victory against impunity. Because 
Decree 1095 returns the prosecution of 
human rights violations to military court 
where impunity is likely, the progress made 
over the last two decades may substantially 
relapse. Considering the military’s abusive 
history and the important function of social 
movements in Peru, Decree 1095 danger-
ously opens the door to future abuses that 
may never be redressed if tried in military 
courts.
conteMporary Slavery in tHe 
bolivian cHaco
Approximately 600 Guarani families are 
subjected to systems of debt bondage and 
forced labor, primarily in agriculture, on 
large estates in the Bolivian Chaco, accord-
ing to a recent Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights report. Despite Bolivia’s 
clear obligation to prohibit and prevent 
slavery as a state party to the 1926 Slavery 
Convention and International Labor 
Convention (ILO) Convention 29 on forced 
labor, the state has not sought to prosecute 
the violators. The Guarani remain captive 
primarily because of political divisions in 
the country, which have weakened the state 
and prevented prosecution.
The prohibition of slavery is consid-
ered jus cogens — a peremptory norm 
from which no derogation is permissible 
under international law. The 1926 Slavery 
Convention defines slavery as the “condi-
tion of a person over whom any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of own-
ership are exercised.” In June 1930, the 
ILO expanded the definition of slavery to 
include forced labor through Convention 
29 (ILO Convention 29). ILO Convention 
29 defines forced labor as “all work or 
service which is exacted from any person 
under . . . penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily.” 
The incorporation of forced labor into the 
definition of slavery effectively removed 
the requirement of ownership from the 
1926 Slavery Convention and its 1956 
supplement.
Furthermore, the Slavery Convention’s 
1956 supplement incorporates the concepts 
of debt bondage and serfdom. Under the 
1956 supplement, debt bondage is defined 
as a condition in which one’s services to 
pay a debt are not reasonably assessed 
and applied to that debt, and serfdom as 
a condition in which a person is forced 
to live and labor on land belonging to 
another without freedom to change his or 
her status.
Bolivia is a state party to both the 
Slavery Convention, its supplement, 
and ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. 
Bolivia’s domestic law, including both the 
current and most recent Bolivian con-
stitutions, also outlaws the practice of 
forced labor. As do the Bolivian Criminal 
Code and Supreme Decree Number 28159, 
which specifically targets slavery of the 
Guarani in the Chaco region.
Individuals may inherit the debt of 
their parents and are often only permit-
ted to repay it through more labor. Their 
labor is then not applied fairly to the 
debt—demonstrating the cyclical use of 
forced labor and systematic debt bondage, 
prohibited in the 1956 supplement to the 
Slavery Convention. Forced laborers live 
under threat of corporal punishment and 
must perform excessive physical labor to 
repay their debts to estate owners who have 
coerced them into fraudulent contracts. 
Compensation for labor is minimal or 
given in-kind. The estate owner is the only 
source of critical needs such as food, cloth-
ing, and medicine but sells the items at 
prices excessively higher than the market. 
This nominal compensation coupled with 
the overpriced goods perpetuates ongoing 
indebtedness. Furthermore, only the estate 
owners record the payments and debts. 
The families are not free to seek work 
elsewhere, and if they insist on going to 
another estate, they are usually sold along 
with their debt, which is characterized a 
form of serfdom.
Although the Bolivian government 
acknowledges and condemns modern forms 
of slavery, it has been unsuccessful in pros-
ecuting violators because of a complex set 
of financial and political challenges. Those 
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challenges include a weak state presence 
in the Chaco region and an insufficient 
number of police, judges, prosecutors, and 
public defenders. Additionally, many of the 
landowners are in local or regional govern-
ment positions.
However, as the issue gains more 
attention, the most significant challenge 
to enforcement is the political division 
between the lowland region, where the 
Guarani reside, and the rest of the country. 
In recent years, the region has pushed for 
increased autonomy from the central state 
and the ruling party’s policies, includ-
ing nationalization, agrarian reform, and 
indigenous empowerment. If the regional 
leaders enforce agrarian reform, it will be 
contradictory to their expressed preference 
for privatization. If they embrace indige-
nous repatriation, then they will contradict 
their efforts to resist the 2009 constitu-
tion, which sought to give greater rights 
to marginalized indigenous communities. 
The political stalemate is preventing the 
cooperation needed between regional and 
national authorities to prosecute the estate 
owners.
In spite of heavy political divisions, the 
national government cannot ignore slavery 
while making political compromises with 
the eastern lowlands. The State has the 
legal responsibility to meet its international 
obligations and uphold its domestic law in 
the case of the Guarani by devoting the 
resources and political capital necessary 
for prosecuting those responsible for slav-
ery conditions in the Chaco region. Most 
notably, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights has scheduled a hear-
ing for October 2010, where Bolivia will 
report on any progress made in remedying 
the situation, as per the Commissions sug-
gestions at a prior hearing.
Jessica Lynd, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Latin America for the Human Rights Brief.
Sub-SaHaran aFrica
Kiobel deciSion SigniFicantly 
liMitS corporate liability For 
HuMan rigHtS violationS
In the face of allegations that Royal 
Dutch Shell aided and abetted in human 
rights violations perpetrated by the 
Nigerian government, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has rejected the theory that corporations 
can be held liable in the United States 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 
If upheld, the recent Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum decision will significantly 
limit legal recourse available to victims 
of human rights abuses attributable to a 
corporate entity.
In Kiobel, a group of residents from 
the Ogoni region of Nigeria alleged that 
government forces subjected members 
of their community to summary execu-
tions, beatings, rapes, arbitrary arrests, and 
destruction of property throughout 1993 
and 1994. They further alleged that these 
abuses aimed to reprimand a community 
movement to protest the environmental 
effects of oil exploration in the resource-
rich region, and that the defendant Shell 
provided significant financial and logisti-
cal assistance to the perpetrators. Filing 
suit under the ATCA, the plaintiffs argued 
that the corporation should be held liable 
for what amounted to grave human rights 
violations and crimes against humanity.
The court proceeded on the premise 
that the scope of liability under the ATCA 
is determined by customary international 
law or norms that are “specific, universal, 
and obligatory in the relations of states 
inter se.” It then examined a broad range of 
sources — international tribunals, treaties, 
and the work of renowned academics — 
and concluded that, while individual and 
state liability has been firmly established 
since Nuremberg, customary international 
law to date has “steadfastly rejected” the 
notion of corporate liability. There is no 
basis, according to the court, for jurisdic-
tion over Shell under the ATCA.
It might appear that this decision has 
rendered the corporate entity eternally 
immune in United States courts for any 
abuses it may commit or support abroad. 
Yet, in its opinion the court explicitly nar-
rowed its position: until corporate liability 
under international law evolves to the point 
of universal recognition and acceptance so 
as to constitute customary international 
law, it cannot be the basis for an ATCA 
claim.
Although there was speculation that 
the U.S. Supreme Court might address 
the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATCA in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, it instead recently denied 
the petition for certiorari in that case with-
out explanation. Furthermore, Kiobel was 
recently adopted by the Second Circuit 
in another ATCA case against Firestone, 
alleging profit from forced labor and child 
labor at its rubber plantation in Liberia. 
Meanwhile, the Kiobel plaintiffs have 
requested en banc review. If ultimately 
upheld, however, the decision represents 
a setback for human rights activists who 
battled in recent years to revive ATCA and 
expand the spectrum of legal options avail-
able against corporate entities that commit 
or otherwise support human rights abuses 
in pursuit of the bottom line.
The ramifications of the decision are 
particularly far-reaching in certain regions 
of sub-Saharan Africa, where vast natural 
resources coexist with poor labor regula-
tions, low standards of living, corrupt and 
unstable regimes, and prolonged civil and 
regional conflict. Many corporate entities 
have been able to take deliberate advan-
tage of these conditions without effective 
regulation and often at the expense of local 
communities.
The absence of local and regional jus-
tice mechanisms capable of effectively 
holding corporate entities liable throughout 
the continent has forced affected commu-
nities to seek forums for redress elsewhere. 
Nigeria’s judicial system, for example, 
is among the world’s most corrupt, and 
circumstances such as those in Kiobel 
reveal an intimate relationship between the 
government and the corporate entity. Until 
the decision in Kiobel, ATCA represented 
one possible avenue to justice, although 
prior ATCA claims against corporations 
had only resulted in out-of-court settle-
ments and raising awareness more gener-
ally. Where the case has been decided, as 
in Bowoto v. Chevron arising out of events 
in Nigeria, courts have ruled in favor of the 
accused entity.
Other recent developments offer some 
promise of better protection against human 
rights violations attributable to corporate 
dealings and objectives. The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in particular has been work-
ing to articulate the human rights obliga-
tions and responsibilities of corporate enti-
ties. Furthermore, recent court proceedings 
against Trafigura in both the Netherlands 
and Britain reflect an emerging commit-
ment to hold corporations accountable in 
those nations for violations committed 
abroad. Despite these efforts, the Kiobel 
decision exposes a void within the frame-
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work of international law based on the 
legal status of corporate non-state actors 
and the corresponding lack of international 
enforcement mechanisms.
In his separate opinion, Judge Leval 
stressed that Kiobel “deals a substantial 
blow to international law and its undertak-
ing to protect fundamental human rights.” 
Ultimately, however, he concurred in the 
decision, conceding that international law 
to date “[does] not provide civil liabil-
ity against any private actor and [does] 
not provide for any form of liability of 
corporations.” This legal truth is espe-
cially troubling in an era of fundamental 
changes to the international world order, 
in which corporations extend farther and 
possess greater influence than many of the 
states whose resources they pursue. Unless 
the Kiobel decision receives a very bold 
review and is overturned, it will remain for 
the international community to establish 
the norm of corporate liability without 
the active participation of the U.S. court 
system.
electionS coMMiSSion approveS 
ForMer Warlord’S preSidential 
caMpaign: a SetbacK to liberia’S 
rebuilding proceSS
As the citizens of Liberia prepare to 
elect a new president in October 2011, the 
National Elections Commission has ruled 
that Prince Yormie Johnson may partici-
pate as a candidate in the race. A current 
senator from Nimba County, Johnson is 
more infamously known as a former war-
lord and leader of the since-disbanded 
Independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (INPFL). As a breakaway faction 
of Charles Taylor’s own rebel group, the 
INPFL established a significant presence 
in the early stages of Liberia’s civil war 
by capturing, torturing, and killing then-
President Samuel K. Doe in September 
1990. Charles Taylor filled Doe’s vacant 
post at the apex of Liberia’s crumbling 
government, and the nation plunged further 
into prolonged conflict.
In the following years, Liberia was 
wracked by intensified fighting between 
several rebel groups and Taylor’s govern-
ment forces, with each carrying out sys-
tematic human rights violations against 
civilians. Taylor fled the country in 2003 
following the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, and Liberia emerged from 
civil war into a crippling humanitarian cri-
sis. Over 250,000 citizens had been killed 
over nearly fourteen years of violence, and 
over one-third of the population displaced. 
The United Nations soon thereafter estab-
lished a peacekeeping presence in Liberia, 
and the post-conflict disarmament, reinte-
gration, and reconciliation process began 
to take shape.
One crucial element of the rebuilding 
process was the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), the legitimacy of 
which has been severely undermined by the 
National Election Commission’s decision. 
The TRC was launched in 2006 to facilitate 
the delicate process of Liberia’s rebirth and 
renewal and to shed an accurate, unbiased 
light on the root causes of the conflict, 
the breadth of human rights and interna-
tional law violations, the experiences of 
women and children, and the exploitation 
of natural resources in furtherance of war-
time objectives. Despite deficiencies in its 
process, ranging from limited resources 
and scarce evidence to poor coordination 
and internal discord, the TRC’s findings 
reflect a commitment to the principles of 
the mandate — justice, accountability, and 
reconciliation — and a sincere desire to lay 
a foundation for lasting peace and stability.
In its Final Report, issued in late 2009, 
the TRC concluded that Prince Johnson was 
the conflict’s most notorious perpetrator of 
violence and disarray and recommended 
that he face criminal prosecution for gross 
violations of both domestic and interna-
tional law. The Report also urged that, at 
minimum, Johnson and other alleged per-
petrators be restricted from holding public 
office for a period of thirty years.
While the decision to admit Johnson 
publicly undermines these conclusions, it 
is nonetheless defensible on constitutional 
grounds, as Liberia’s Constitution affords 
all citizens the right to seek office, pro-
vided minimal demographic standards are 
met. Implicit in the TRC’s recommenda-
tion, however, is a call to democratically 
amend the Constitution, notably untouched 
since prior to the outbreak of civil war, 
to embed in its fabric higher standards of 
eligibility intended to protect principles of 
human rights. As any constitutional amend-
ments must be ratified by referendum, the 
effort would provide a rare opportunity for 
the citizens of Liberia to raise a potent, 
unified voice against impunity. Only with 
the integrated efforts of the Elections 
Commission could proposed amendments 
gather momentum, yet their decision here 
indicates that it will either ignore or con-
sciously resist the TRC’s recommendation.
What will come of Prince Johnson’s 
participation in the presidential race will 
not be known until October 2011. While he 
continues to draw support from within his 
native Nimba County, international human 
rights observers contend it is grounded not 
in respect, but in fear that he will again 
become a violent and destabilizing force 
if not elected. The bitter memories of civil 
war and indiscriminate violence linger in 
the collective consciousness of Liberians, 
and as a core perpetrator, Prince Johnson 
remains a public face of this suffering. 
In disregarding the TRC’s call for public 
sanctions, the Elections Commission has 
threatened the efficacy of an accountability 
measure potentially capable of restoring 
the confidence of Liberia’s weary popula-
tion in its public institutions. It has sent a 
telling message of free license to perpe-
trators and obstructed the aspirations of 
others for a future that does not resemble 
the past.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Sub-Saharan Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
europe
ÉgalitÉ, FraternitÉ, expulSÉ—
FrencH expulSion oF tHe roMa
The French government’s recent pol-
icy to shut down Roma encampments in 
France is drawing attention and criticism 
from the European community. Many are 
concerned with the potential violations 
of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (ECFR) and the 2004 European 
Union Freedom of Movement Directive 
(Directive). Article II-81 of the ECFR 
states that any discrimination based on eth-
nic or social origin shall be prohibited, and 
Article II-79 of the ECFR prohibits col-
lective expulsions. The Directive enforces 
the rights of EU citizens and their family 
members to move and reside freely within 
member states; however, for periods of 
residence longer than three months, mem-
ber states can require registration by EU 
citizens.
On September 29, 2010, the European 
Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding, 
told French radio that the European 
Commission has launched infringement 
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proceedings against France for breaching 
the EU’s ban on ethnic discrimination. 
The Commission’s action could lead to a 
complaint at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (Court).
A leaked September 11, 2010 document 
from the French Ministry of the Interior 
indicated that Roma from Romania and 
Bulgaria are the principal targets of French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy. From 
August to September 2010, the French 
government deported approximately 1,000 
Roma. Most of the deportees have been put 
on planes, mainly to Bucharest, Romania, 
after receiving €300 per adult and €100 
per child, and signing a declaration affirm-
ing that they are leaving voluntarily. The 
remaining deportees were kicked out of 
the country due to criminal records and 
for violating residency registration require-
ments. Although the French government 
justified the expulsion policy on the basis 
that deported Roma resided in France for 
over three months without work or resi-
dency permits, the September 11 document 
suggests that the Roma were targeted on 
account of their ethnicity.
This recent government action was 
prompted by several riots that erupted in 
the Loire Valley of Central France in July 
2010, as a result of the shooting and killing 
of a young French Roma Luigi Duquenet 
by French police. Duquenet was shot at a 
checkpoint after he recklessly drove and 
hit a gendarme. Following the riots, the 
French government decided to close down 
300 encampments within three months. 
Sarkozy described the Roma camps as 
sources of “illicit trafficking, deeply dis-
graceful living conditions, and the exploi-
tation of children through begging, pros-
titution, and delinquency.” By the end 
of August 2010, the French government 
dismantled over 128 encampments.
On September 9, 2010, the European 
Parliament passed a Resolution by 337 
votes to 245 calling on the French gov-
ernment to “immediately suspend all 
expulsions of Roma,” and stating that 
the policy “amounted to discrimination.” 
In response to accusations of ethnic dis-
crimination, the French government main-
tains that each expulsion is decided on 
a case-by-case basis, and that national 
security and the enforcement of immigra-
tion laws, not ethnicity, are the deciding 
factors. On October 19, 2010, less than a 
week before the Commission’s deadline for 
France to change its policy, the European 
Commission suspended infringement pro-
cedures against France. Commissioner 
Reding stated that France “has responded 
positively” and has promised to adopt pro-
cedural changes in the French Senate as per 
the Commission’s requirements.
Nevertheless, the newly enacted policy 
disproportionately effects the Roma popu-
lation in France. Éric Besson, France’s 
Minister of Immigration, said that the 
ECFR, which outlaws discrimination on 
ethnic grounds, is respected scrupulously 
in France, and the government only tar-
geted and expelled individuals who posed 
a threat to public order. Besson further 
emphasized that “no collective expulsions 
were undertaken.”
Beyond the immediate consequences 
for the local Roma populations, the French 
policy may have significant implications 
on the interpretation of EU legislation. 
This policy discredits the authority of legal 
standards set forth in the ECFR, which 
ensures that the EU protects the rights of 
citizens in its member states. The infrac-
tion proceedings initiated against France 
before the Court will determine how EU 
legislation on freedom of movement and 
minority rights will be interpreted and 
applied uniformly across all EU member 
states. The Court’s ruling will bear impor-
tance to future efforts to hold EU member 
states accountable for the respect of human 
rights of other member states’ citizens. The 
level to which France is held responsible 
for implementing European law into its 
domestic law will set a precedent for the 
punishment of future violations of minor-
ity rights.
France’S burQa ban paSSeS 
conStitutional MuSter
The French government’s ban on cloth-
ing that covers individuals’ faces when in 
public, including the burqa and the niqab 
worn by Muslim women, has passed its 
last domestic legal hurdle. The burqa is a 
full-body garment with a narrow gauze-
covered eye opening, while the niqab, 
has just a narrow eye opening. France’s 
Concealment Act (Act), which prohib-
its the covering of the face in a public 
space, passed through France’s National 
Assembly and Senate with overwhelming 
support earlier this year. On October 11, 
2010, the Constitutional Council’s decision 
No. 2010-613 rendered the Act constitu-
tional. Despite constitutional approval, the 
legality of the Act may be brought into 
question before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).
The French Constitutional Council 
(Council), France’s highest legal author-
ity, ruled that the law does not create dis-
proportionate punishments and therefore 
conforms to the constitution. The Council 
found that the Act conformed to Article 10 
of the French Constitution pertaining to 
religious expression, after amending the 
text to state: the ban cannot apply in places 
of worship. The Council did not specifi-
cally mention the wearing of face-covering 
clothing in mosques, but it did suggest 
that extending the ban to places of public 
worship might violate religious freedom. 
Anyone violating the ban will be subject 
to a fine of €150 or required to complete a 
citizenship course, and anyone who forces 
another individual to conceal her face in 
public will be subject to a one-year prison 
term or a fine of up to €30,000.
This new law extends the prohibitions 
of French law No. 2004-228 of 15 March 
2004, which banned the displaying or 
wearing of overt religious symbols in all 
public schools, including headscarves 
worn by Muslim schoolgirls. The 2004 law 
specifically applies to the public display 
of religious symbols or clothing, whereas 
the text of the Concealment Act does not 
make explicit reference to Islam or the 
Islamic veil. French President, Nicolas 
Sarkozy has eluded that the Act is aimed 
at Muslim women, stating: “The burqa is 
not a religious sign, it’s a sign of subservi-
ence, a sign of debasement . . . It will not 
be welcome on the territory of the French 
Republic.” However, the Concealment Act 
does not specifically mention the words 
“Muslim,” “women,” or “veil” in any of 
its six articles; rather, the law generally 
references clothing designed to cover the 
face. Nevertheless, many fear that the Act 
will disproportionately stigmatize France’s 
Muslim population, the largest in Europe.
Many human rights organizations, 
including Amnesty International, view the 
ban as a violation of essential human rights 
defined by the Charter for the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (Charter) 
and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), to which France is a state 
party. Both Article 9 of the ECHR and 
Article 10 of the Charter seek to ensure 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief 
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in worship and observance. The same is 
true for Article 18 of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and Article 18 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Concurrently, the principal 
document enunciating women’s rights, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) recognizes a state obligation to 
take measures to abolish laws, regulations, 
customs, and practices that discriminate 
against women (Article 2) and to modify 
social and cultural patterns to eliminate 
discriminatory practices (Article 5).
Rather than an infringement on reli-
gious freedom, the French government 
views the decision by the Council as an 
important affirmation of French values 
– equality between men and women, and 
secularism. The French government also 
justifies the ban on the basis of national 
security. French authorities assert that “the 
ability to cover the face in a public place 
is a security hazard in a time of increased 
threat from terrorist organizations.”
Now that France’s Constitutional 
Council has approved the Concealment 
Act, only the ECtHR can strike it down 
and render a binding opinion on France. 
The likely success of a claim against the 
ban before the ECtHR is uncertain. In 
Aktas, Bayrakand and others v. France (no. 
435631/08) decision of June 30, 2009, the 
ECtHR rejected the admissibility of com-
plaints filed by four Muslim girls and two 
Sikh boys, who were expelled from public 
schools in France in 2004 for violating the 
law prohibiting the wearing of clothing 
or symbols expressly showing the stu-
dents’ religion. The ruling upheld the 2004 
law reasoning that the restrictions on the 
manifestation of religion were necessary 
to guarantee public order and maintain the 
rights and freedoms of others.
The French law reflects a growing ten-
sion between the right to religious freedom 
in a secular country and the affirmation of 
women’s rights, two principles that are pro-
moted and protected by international law. 
While France claims the new law is a step 
forward for the rights of Muslim women 
and Muslim leaders concur that Islam does 
not require women to hide their faces, the 
ban elicits outcries from both Muslim fun-
damentalists and human rights advocates. 
With this new law, France may be trying 
to enforce women’s rights within CEDAW, 
but in doing so, France is infringing on 
what many Muslim women in France may 
regard as their religious freedoms.
Molly Hofsommer, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
covers Europe for the Human Rights Brief.
SoutH and central aSia
rape victiMS SubJected to “Finger” 
teSt in india
In India, physicians are allowed to 
perform a “finger” test on rape victims to 
determine their level of sexual activity. If a 
physician is able to insert two fingers into 
the victim’s vagina, she may be considered 
“habituated” to sex. Results of the exami-
nation are admissible in court and can be 
used to undermine the credibility of an 
unmarried rape survivor, according to a 
recent Human Rights Watch report. There 
are several international instruments that 
commit states, including India, to uphold a 
women’s right to pursue medical attention 
and legal remedies, and would prohibit the 
use of the finger test.
The international community has 
taken measures to stop sexual violence 
and encourage the prosecution of sexual 
offenders. According to United Nations 
Resolution 62/134 (Resolution), states are 
obligated to exercise due diligence to pre-
vent, investigate, and punish sexual crimes. 
The Resolution further urges states, “[to] 
provide victims with access to appropriate 
health care, including sexual and reproduc-
tive health care, psychological care, and 
trauma [counseling].”
Various international laws protect wom-
en’s rights. Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.” India ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), and article 
5(a) of CEDAW obligates states to “modify 
. . . social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of men and women” to prevent prejudice 
based on gender stereotypes. Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
extends the “ . . . right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and mental health.”
The finger test likely violates the 
women’s rights articulated in the UDHR, 
CEDAW, and ICESCR. Furthermore, the 
finger test may deter rape victims who fear 
subjection to such an invasive procedure or 
the potentially damaging results from com-
ing forward. In addition to violating clearly 
established international human rights law, 
the finger test, by creating a potential dis-
incentive for women to come forward after 
being raped, also undermines the justice 
system by allowing some rapists to escape 
punishment.
India has taken some steps to prevent 
the use of the finger test. In 2005, the 
Supreme Court of India held in State of 
Uttar Pradesh v. Pappu that a rape victim’s 
prior sexual activity is irrelevant. More 
recently, on October 23, 2010, Additional 
Sessions Judge Kamini Lau condemned 
the finger test in a rape case before her 
court. She said, “The test is violative of the 
fundamental right to privacy of the victim 
. . . State action cannot be a threat to the 
constitutional right of an individual. What 
has shocked my conscience is that this test 
is being carried out in a routine manner on 
victims of sexual offences (even minors) 
by doctors.” She recommended that police 
should be sensitized to the issue. The court 
opinion stated that courts should review 
irrelevant procedures and reject immaterial 
evidence. It is yet to be seen whether the 
Delhi court’s order will be followed.
Furthermore, there is a proposed amend-
ment in the legislature to the Criminal Law 
Bill, which states, “previous sexual experi-
ence with any person shall not be relevant 
on the issue of such consent or the quality 
of consent.” Also this year, India estab-
lished a committee, headed by Justice Gita 
Mittal, to consider further amendments to 
sexual violence laws. The committee has 
not yet released a formal response to the 
use of the finger test.
Despite efforts by the national court 
system, legislature, and medical organiza-
tions to ban the finger test, local doctors, 
attorneys, judges, and police officers are 
still authorizing the test. Human Rights 
Watch identified eighteen Indian states, 
including three major Mumbai hospitals, 
which still use the finger test. In June 2010, 
the Maharashtra government standardized 
how many fingers to use during the test, 
and earlier this year, the Delhi government 
requested reports regarding whether the 
orifice is “roomy” or “narrow.” The inac-
tion of India’s national government shows 
that it is either unable or unwilling to 
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enforce the Supreme Court’s five-year-old 
decision.
Despite attempts to dissuade the use of 
the finger test, the practice is still used on 
women in a country with the second larg-
est population in the world, even though 
the finger test clearly violates international 
laws and obligations to protect the right to 
privacy and bodily integrity.
accountability in Sri lanKa? 
leSSonS learnt and reconciliation 
coMMiSSion
Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) 
has come under scrutiny for its lack of 
accountability and efficacy as a truth-
seeking mechanism. While the LLRC 
has made some progressive suggestions, 
like the need to improve conditions for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), it has 
also rejected assistance from international 
experts. Faced with allegations of war 
crimes committed by Sri Lankan forces 
and rebel group members, Sri Lanka and 
the international community have not taken 
the necessary steps to ensure accountabil-
ity for the alleged crimes.
Typically, a truth commission is a non-
judicial body that is tasked with inves-
tigating past wrongdoings. Much of its 
success depends on its transparency and 
accountability, which in turn relies on 
its autonomy. Truth-seeking mechanisms 
work to end impunity by exposing infor-
mation about past human rights violations 
to the public.
In an apparent effort to stave off inter-
national scrutiny, Sri Lankan President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa established the LLRC 
in May 2010 to investigate the failure of 
the Norwegian-brokered peace process. 
For 25 years, the Sri Lankan government 
fought against the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In 2009, at the end of 
the conflict, government forces pushed the 
LTTE into a small area in northeastern Sri 
Lanka. U.S. State Department reports and 
interest groups allege that the government 
and the rebel group are jointly respon-
sible for 7,000 civilian casualties, tens of 
thousands of injured civilians, and forced 
disappearances.
Survivors have stated that the gov-
ernment killed rebels who surrendered, 
a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions requiring the humane treat-
ment of combatants who have laid down 
their arms. Human rights and relief organi-
zations have also accused the government 
of blocking humanitarian aid, including 
aid from the Red Cross. Further, interna-
tional observers have alleged that the Sri 
Lankan government intentionally bombed 
and attacked facilities in areas populated 
by minority groups, violating Geneva 
Convention IV, which protects civilians 
from direct military attacks.
Numerous human rights organizations 
have criticized the LLRC’s mandate as 
too narrow and ill-equipped to investigate 
alleged war crimes in 2009. Furthermore, 
similar commissions in Sri Lanka in the 
past thirty years have suffered from a 
lack of transparency. With this in mind, 
the United Nations (UN) is pressuring Sri 
Lanka to consent to an investigation of 
the events that took place from January to 
May 2009, but Sri Lanka refuses UN par-
ticipation in the truth-seeking process. UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has set up 
a panel of three experts on international 
law to report on legal standards appli-
cable to the situation in Sri Lanka. The UN 
panelists are available as a “resource” to 
the LLRC at the discretion of the govern-
ment. Sri Lankan authorities, however, 
have denied the need for an oversight panel 
and reasserted the LLRC’s internal auton-
omy. In June, Sri Lanka denied the panel-
ists’ visas to enter the country, and a Sri 
Lankan Cabinet minister led demonstra-
tions against the UN in Colombo in July.
Despite an international outcry that Sri 
Lankan forces and the LTTE violated inter-
national humanitarian law during the end of 
the conflict, Sri Lankan Defense Secretary 
Nandasena Gotabhaya Rajapaksa denies 
that these allegations have been brought to 
his attention. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa refuted 
reports of civilian deaths during the con-
flict, arguing that what were perceived as 
civilian deaths were in fact rebels in civil-
ian disguise. In a June 2010 interview with 
the BBC, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa further 
attempted to suppress the investigation 
when he threatened to execute a general 
who promised to cooperate with investiga-
tions of war violations.
Sri Lanka has benefited from financial 
aid and increased tourism since the end of 
the conflict and, in the last fiscal year, has 
received more foreign aid than ever before. 
However, there has been no accountability 
for the crimes committed by the Sri Lankan 
forces or the LTTE. In order to increase 
the pressure on Sri Lanka to take action, 
the United States and UN could work with 
the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and China, the most gener-
ous provider of aid, to impose sanctions 
on Sri Lanka until it can account for the 
effectiveness of the LLRC. As another 
option to pressure Sri Lanka, the UN 
Security Council could take steps to create 
an international ad-hoc tribunal under its 
UN Charter Chapter VII powers. However, 
a first step toward accountability would be 
allowing the UN panel to meet with the 
LLRC in Sri Lanka.
Misty Seemans, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
South and Central Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
eaSt aSia
cHina inFringeS on religiouS 
FreedoMS
On November 1, 2010, a new reg-
ulation tightening Chinese control over 
Tibetan monasteries entered into effect. 
According to Xinhua, the official news 
agency of China, the new “Management 
Measure for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries 
and Temples” prohibits foreign individu-
als and organizations from involvement 
in monastery affairs. China hopes that the 
measure will minimize negative foreign 
impact on public order, health, and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of oth-
ers. Although a notice issued by China’s 
State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA) specifies that “legitimate” rights 
and interests of the Tibetan Buddhist reli-
gion remain protected under law, one impli-
cation of the new regulation is that any 
connections between the Tibetan Buddhists 
living in China and those living in exile, 
including the Dalai Lama, are illegal. The 
new measure is contrary to China’s own 
Constitution and its 2005 Regulations on 
Religious Affairs (RRAs), which were 
established to “ensur[e] citizens’ freedom 
of religious belief,” because it limits the 
influence of the religion’s leaders and 
scholars who do not pose a threat public 
order, health, and morals or fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.
China’s Constitution and the 2005 
RRAs protect the freedom of religion 
in Tibet. Article 36 of the Chinese 
Constitution states that “[c]itizens of the 
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People’s Republic of China enjoy free-
dom of religious belief ” and that “[n]o 
state organ, public organization or indi-
vidual may compel citizens to believe 
in, or not believe in, any religio[n].” The 
RRAs, established to protect the freedom 
of religion, use language similar to that 
in the Constitution, and further state that 
the government “protects normal religious 
activities, and safeguards the lawful rights 
and interests of religious bodies, sites for 
religious activities and religious citizens.”
Despite these protections, China justi-
fies limiting foreign influence on Tibetan 
monasteries based on a provision outlined 
in Article 3 of the RRAs. This provision 
states that, “No organization or individual 
may make use of religion to engage in 
activities that disrupt public order, impair 
[the] health of citizens or interfere with 
the educational system of the State, or in 
other activities that harm State or public 
interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and 
interests.” A similar provision exists in 
Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution. 
While the provision itself does not limit 
religious freedom, China’s application of 
this provision effectively limits the reli-
gious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Prohibiting the influence of foreigners 
on monastery affairs limits the religious 
freedom of Tibetan Buddhists because it 
restricts the Dalai Lama’s involvement in 
the religion, as well as that of a majority 
of Tibetan Buddhism’s scholars. The Dalai 
Lama is the exiled leader of the largest 
and most influential school of Tibetan 
Buddhism, whose role dates back to the 
16th century and has since been a con-
tinual and central practice. According to 
the Central Tibetan Administration, “The 
religious heads and scholars of Tibetan 
Buddhism as a whole are, currently, living 
outside Tibet. Hence, the lineage of the 
sacred Buddhist teachings and initiations 
can be said to be existing in the exiled 
Tibetan community.” As a result, the new 
measure will “obstruct the Buddhist teach-
ing and its sacred transmissions inside 
Tibet and mak[e] it extremely difficult for 
the monastic institutions to undertake their 
important religious activities.”
China considers the new measure appro-
priate because it believes that foreign influ-
ences, including the Dalai Lama, have 
encouraged Tibetan Buddhists to act in a 
way that offends public safety, order, health, 
or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others, violating Article 3 of 
the RRAs. A notice by SARA explaining 
the purpose of the new measures accuses the 
Dalai Lama and his followers of “plot[ting] 
and spread[ing] confusion in the Tibetan 
areas,” ultimately leading to serious influ-
ence over Tibetan Buddhists. The notice 
may be specifically referring to the 2008 
protests in Tibet and similar political unrest 
for which the Chinese government blames 
the Dalai Lama. Although the protests were 
carried out by Tibetan Buddhists, the Dalai 
Lama maintains that they were a result of 
widespread discontent with the Chinese 
government, and were unrelated to Tibetan 
Buddhism as a religion.
The Dalai Lama has continuously 
objected to the use of violence in any form, 
including in protests related to the status 
of Tibet. It is unlikely that his influence 
has caused Tibetan Buddhists to engage 
in activities which “disrupt public order, 
impair [the] health of citizens or interfere 
with the educational system of the State, or 
. . . harm State or public interests, or citi-
zens’ lawful rights and interests.” Barring 
some indication that the Dalai Lama’s 
influence has caused Tibetan Buddhists to 
engage in these kinds of activities, the new 
measure is contrary to the protection of 
religious freedom in China’s Constitution 
and the 2005 RRAs.
Migrant WorKerS or reFugeeS? 
cHina’S obligationS to nortH 
Korean deFectorS
China and North Korea recently 
increased efforts to find North Koreans 
seeking refuge in China. According to a 
recent report by Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese 
daily newspaper, the two countries’ joint 
efforts have already resulted in the cap-
ture of dozens of North Koreans. Since 
the mid 1990s, hundreds of thousands of 
North Koreans have attempted to cross the 
border into China. This year’s food short-
ages have resulted in many more desperate 
North Koreans seeking to enter China in 
search of food. By repatriating these North 
Koreans, China may be violating its obli-
gations under the 1951 Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, if 
North Korean defectors can be considered 
refugees and have individualized concern 
for their life or freedom.
China considers North Korean defec-
tors to be illegal economic migrants, and 
as a result, repatriates them in accordance 
with a bilateral treaty between the two 
countries. Because leaving North Korea 
without permission is considered treason, 
repatriated individuals face imprison-
ment, torture, and death. China has been 
accused of being partially responsible for 
the human rights violations occurring in 
North Korea, as well as violating its obliga-
tions as a signatory to the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol.
The 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol exist to 
protect the rights of refugees. Article 33 of 
the Convention establishes the principle of 
non-refoulement, stating: “No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account 
of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political 
opinion.” While specifically outlined in the 
Convention, the principle of non-refoule-
ment is also considered customary inter-
national law. This principle prohibits the 
return of refugees to their home countries 
if they face danger or persecution there.
Under the 1951 Convention, a “refugee” 
is a person “who, owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion,” is 
unable or unwilling to return to his country. 
Because many of the North Korean defec-
tors are leaving for economic reasons and 
not because of persecution related to “race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a . . . 
social group or political opinion,” China 
defines them as illegal economic migrants. 
The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) distinguishes 
between economic migrants and refugees, 
noting that individuals leaving their home 
countries for purely economic reasons are 
economic migrants. Nevertheless, UNHCR 
also recognizes that the distinction between 
economic and political actions within a 
country is not always clear. For example, 
if economic sanctions or decisions on the 
part of a government have political inten-
tions, one might be considered a refugee 
instead of an economic migrant. China’s 
blanket classification of all North Koreans 
as illegal economic migrants means that at 
least some and possibly all North Koreans 
who are entitled to refugee status are 
wrongly repatriated as illegal economic 
migrants.
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Despite these blurred definitions, 
UNHCR believes that at least some of the 
North Koreans being repatriated by China 
definitely meet the criteria for refugee sta-
tus. Human Rights Watch considers most 
North Koreans in China to be refugees 
sur place (in place) because, even those 
who initially fled North Korea for eco-
nomic reasons, fear persecution if they 
are forced to return. UNHCR describes 
refugees sur place as individuals who have 
not necessarily left the country illegally 
or as individuals who qualify as refugees 
at a later date. UNHCR calls for special 
consideration of situations in which a per-
son’s actions may have been noticed by the 
authorities in the person’s home country, 
and how those actions may be viewed by 
those authorities. Under this definition, 
even if North Koreans were not refugees 
when they left the country, the fear of per-
secution upon return to the country quali-
fies them as refugees.
China’s reluctance to grant asylum to 
North Koreans is, in part, due to policy con-
cerns. Acceptance of North Koreans could 
lead to an increase in individuals crossing 
the border, leaving China with a permanent 
refugee population. Additionally, action 
on China’s part could strain the relation-
ship between the two countries, ultimately 
decreasing the significant influence China 
presently has over North Korea, and desta-
bilizing North Korea generally.
Because China does not grant UNHCR 
access to the border or to North Koreans 
already in China, concrete information 
regarding the reasons for leaving North 
Korea and the persecution faced upon 
return is difficult to obtain. The lack of 
information makes it impossible to deter-
mine with certainty the refugee status of 
most individuals. The recent crackdown on 
North Koreans by the two countries will 
only increase the number of individuals 
whose rights are violated as a result of the 
repatriation policy. China’s policy con-
cerns, however, are not acceptable reasons 
to refuse UNHCR access to the border or 
to fail to comply with obligations under the 
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
East Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
SoutHeaSt aSia and oceania
noveMber 7tH electionS in 
burMa: tHe next Stop on burMa’S 
“roadMap to deMocracy”?
On November 7, 2010, Burma held 
its first elections since the 1990 elections 
that produced dramatic victories for the 
National League for Democracy (NLD). 
Despite the previous election’s conclusive 
results, the military junta ruling Burma 
refused to hand over power to the NLD. 
The recent elections, officially announced 
on August 13, 2010, were potentially a sig-
nificant step from military to civilian rule, 
as outlined in the Burmese government’s 
policy called the Roadmap to Democracy, 
originally released to the public in 2003. 
However, several developments prior to the 
elections, including the exclusion of politi-
cal prisoners from voting, and the closure 
of polls in many border townships, home to 
minority ethnic groups, indicated that even 
though the Roadmap calls for “fair and free 
elections,” the November 7 elections were 
not going to be free nor fair.
Leaders and organizations from around 
the world, including United Nations 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), urged Burmese leaders to 
change their election policies. Article 21, 
Section 3 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) is generally 
accepted as a reflection of customary inter-
national law regarding elections: “[t]he 
will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elec-
tions which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote 
or by equivalent free voting procedures.” 
Although Burma is not a state party to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), its failure to live 
up to the standards set forth in the UDHR 
may seriously undermine the validity of the 
elections.
One of the main issues under contention 
was a Burmese law that prohibits political 
prisoners from participating in any election 
activity, including voting. On September 
23, 2010, Amnesty International called for 
the immediate and unconditional release 
of all political prisoners in Burma. On 
election day, about 2,200 individuals were 
being held on the basis of political beliefs, 
including Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the 
former NLD. Suu Kyi, joined by her other 
NLD colleagues, called for the boycott of 
the elections. Labeling them “unfair and 
unjust,” Suu Kyi missed the opportunity 
to run for office in the elections as she 
was freed from house arrest on November 
13, just one week after the elections took 
place. The junta did, however, give Suu 
Kyi permission to vote in the November 
7 elections on the grounds that her politi-
cal imprisonment, unlike other political 
prisoners, was served through house arrest, 
not jail.
By closing several polling stations on 
the eastern border in the interest of “secu-
rity,” the junta invited even more criticism 
of the November elections. In total, more 
than 300 villages in 33 townships were 
disenfranchised due to the premature poll 
closing. Those same townships are home 
to minority ethnic groups who have refused 
in the past to join the Burmese border 
guard. The government failed to provide 
any alternative options for voting to the 
disenfranchised, such as an absentee ballot 
or transportation to another polling sta-
tion, violating the democratic principles of 
equal and universal suffrage pertinent to 
customary international law.
On September 28, 2010, Burmese 
Foreign Minister Nyan Win spoke before 
the UN General Assembly, insisting that 
the junta is committed to doing its best 
to ensure successful, free, and fair elec-
tions. Alluding to the restrictive election 
measures, Win commented that Burma 
has, “ample experiences and lessons learnt 
in holding multiparty general elections.” 
Although Win did not directly address 
the junta’s rationale for the polling station 
closures, experts believe it was a combina-
tion of security and economic concerns, 
citing a lack of ceasefires in ongoing 
conflicts between armed ethnic groups and 
the Burmese military, as well as an interest 
in preserving border security to maintain 
increasing trade with China. The junta 
failed to ensure “universal and equal suf-
frage” by making the November 7 elections 
accessible to all, falling short of its respon-
sibility under Article 21 of the UDHR. 
Such a failure severely undermines not 
only Burma’s “Roadmap to Democracy,” 
by discrediting a core goal of the plan, 
but will delegitimize further efforts, real 
or contrived, to democratize Burma in the 
near term.
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tHailand in trouble
In early October, the Thai government 
announced that it would extend the rule 
of emergency law in Bangkok and three 
other provinces adjacent to the capital 
for another three months. The Thai gov-
ernment’s April 2009 original enactment 
of an emergency decree, due to polit-
ical upheaval, has given way to many 
human rights abuses, such as censorship 
of expression and restraints on peaceful 
assembly. The extension comes at a time 
when the government, currently holding 
the UN Human Rights Council presidency, 
has articulated fears of renewed violence 
due to political protests and, more impor-
tantly, politically motivated bombings 
since March 2010. The factual basis under 
which the extension was granted, how-
ever, is increasingly dubious. Many critics 
believe it is a way to silence the political 
opposition, a move Thailand vigorously 
denies. Additionally, reports from political 
prisoners allege that Thailand is stepping 
outside of the permitted boundaries of an 
emergency decree, under international law, 
by violating non-derogable rights protected 
in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
As a state party to the ICCPR, Thailand 
is legally obligated to abide by the provi-
sions of the Covenant. Article 4 of the 
Covenant states that during a “public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed” the states may take measures 
“derogating from their obligations under 
the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with their other obligations under 
international law.” A further stipulation is 
that the state party to the Covenant must 
immediately inform the other States Parties 
of its decision to derogate. To the extent 
that it has complied with the notification 
requirement, Thailand promptly informed 
the international community of both its 
decision to derogate and of the subsequent 
extension, insisting that the extension of 
the emergency decree was a necessary 
move to preserve stability.
National and international human rights 
advocates question whether the “life of the 
nation” has truly been threatened by the 
recent increase in political demonstrations, 
as the protests in Bangkok had been peace-
ful until one month after the enactment of 
the emergency decree. If the ongoing situa-
tion in Thailand does not constitute a threat 
to the “life of the nation,” it would mean 
that Thailand has illegally derogated from 
the treaty, violating fundamental human 
rights and other Articles of the ICCPR.
Specifically, there is evidence that the 
rights under Articles 9, 19 and 21 of the 
ICCPR, or the right to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, and the right to 
peaceful assembly and association, respec-
tively, are being violated. Currently, inter-
net censorship, forced closures of certain 
media groups (such as radio stations), 
and arrests and “silencing” of politi-
cal opposition members, are among the 
charges. The Centre for the Resolution of 
the Emergency Situation (CRES), a group 
created by the government and military “to 
coordinate and administer the Emergency 
Decree,” have disabled or censored 1,500 
websites, radio and television stations, and 
print publications since early April 2010. 
Additional provisions under the emergency 
law stipulate that arrestees can be detained 
for 30 days without charge or trial, while 
conferring immunity from prosecution for 
officials who have violated human rights in 
the performance of their duties.
Perhaps the most troublesome charges 
for the government are the reports of 
political prisoners who, while waiting for 
further judicial proceedings, are beaten and 
tortured in detention centers. If true, the 
tortuous practices would directly violate 
Article 7 of the ICCPR, the right to not 
be subject to “torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment,” 
thereby making Thailand’s derogation ille-
gal under international law, as subsection 
2 of Article 4 explicitly prohibits deroga-
tions from Article 7, among others (not to 
mention other international prohibitions of 
torture).
If the allegations are true and abuses 
of derogated rights are found, Thailand 
could face international investigations and 
even more serious repercussions from the 
international community, especially at a 
time when it holds a leadership position 
on global human rights. Although Thailand 
has complied with its notification duty 
under Article 4 of the ICCPR, the founda-
tion of its decision to enact and extend an 
emergency decree is highly questionable. 
With allegations that its emergency decree 
is curtailing the rights of many individu-
als—at the very least their right to free 
speech and assembly—Thailand’s global 
authority and position on human rights, in 
general, may be irreparably damaged.
Leah Chavla, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Southeast Asia and Oceania for the Human 
Rights Brief. HRB
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